Impact of the Covid 19 Pandemic on the Indian Economy: A Critical Assessment (NIAS/NSE/EEP/U/WP/18/2020) by Ramakumar, R & Kanitkar, Tejal
Impact of covId-19 pandemIc  
on the IndIan economy:
a crItIcal assessment









NIAS Working Paper                        NIAS/NSE/EEP/U/WP/18/2020 
 
 








Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic on the Indian  





R. Ramakumar  
(Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai) 
 
Tejal Kanitkar 






























National Institute of Advanced Studies 
Indian Institute of Science Campus 
Bengaluru - 560 012 













Cover photo:  Front cover 
          Picture Credit 1: Atul Yadav, PTI 
                       Picture Credit 2: People’s Archive of Rural India 
           
 
          Back cover 

















Table of Contents 
 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................................................. 4 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................................... 5 
THE PANDEMIC AND THE ECONOMY ........................................................................................................ 6 
THE TRAJECTORY OF THE PANDEMIC IN INDIA................................................................................... 7 
The national lockdown ................................................................................................................................................. 8 
The lockdown and the spread of infections ..................................................................................................................... 9 
Health preparedness during the lockdown ................................................................................................................... 11 
THE PANDEMIC AND THE INDIAN ECONOMY .................................................................................... 11 
Indian economy before Covid-19 ................................................................................................................................. 11 
Lockdown and the economy: Nature of impacts........................................................................................................... 15 
Agriculture ............................................................................................................................................................ 15 
Animal husbandry ................................................................................................................................................ 17 
Industry ................................................................................................................................................................. 17 
Impact on employment ................................................................................................................................................ 20 
Lockdown and migrant workers ................................................................................................................................. 21 
QUANTIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ................................................................................... 22 
Input-Output analysis: A methodological departure .................................................................................................... 22 
Our method ................................................................................................................................................................ 24 
Our estimates ............................................................................................................................................................. 25 
THE GOVERNMENT’S ECONOMIC RESPONSE ....................................................................................... 26 
CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................................... 29 
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................................... 30 























List of Figures 
 
Figure 1 Daily numbers of confirmed cases, number of deaths and number of tests, India, United States and 
Brazil, December 2019 to August 2020 ............................................................................................ 10 
Figure 1a Daily new confirmed Covid-19 cases, 7-day rolling average, Y-axis on linear scale ........................... 10 
Figure 1b Daily new confirmed Covid-19 cases per million population, 7-day rolling average, Y-axis on linear 
scale .................................................................................................................................................... 10 
Figure 1c Daily new confirmed Covid-19 deaths per million people, 7-day rolling average, Y-axis on linear scale
........................................................................................................................................................... 10 
Figure 1d Daily new Covid-19 tests per 1,000 people, 7-day rolling average, Y-axis on linear scale ................ 10 
Figure 2 Year-on-year growth rates of Gross Value Added (GVA) at basic price, India, quarterly series, 2004-
05 and 2011-12 base years, in per cent ............................................................................................... 13 
Figure 3 Investment rate and savings rate, India, annual, 2003 to 2019, in per cent to GDP ........................ 13 
Figure 4 Share of exports values in GDP and growth of merchandise exports, India, 2005-06 to 2019-20, in 
per cent ............................................................................................................................................... 13 
Figure 5 Monthly growth rates in domestic credit supply, India, 2004 to 2020, in per cent .............................. 13 
Figure 6 Unemployment rates, India, 2004-05 to 2018-19, principal plus subsidiary status, in per cent ......... 13 
Figure 7 Head count ratios of income poverty, India, 1993-94 to 2017-18, in per cent ................................... 13 
Figure 8 Expenditure of the Union government as a share of GDP, India, 2004 to 2020, in per cent ............ 15 
Figure 9 Index of Industrial Production (IIP), India, monthly, 2019 and 2020, base year 2011-12=100 ..... 18 
Figure 10 Total collection of Goods and Services Tax (GST), India, monthly, nominal figures, 2019 and 2020, 
in Rs million ....................................................................................................................................... 18 
Figure 11 Revenue earning freight traffic of major commodities through Indian Railways, monthly, 2019 and 
2020, in ‘000 tonnes .......................................................................................................................... 19 
Figure 12 Monthly value of total exports, India, 2019 and 2020, in US$ million ......................................... 19 
Figure 13 Index of current economic situation and future economic expectations, India, 2019 and 2020, base 
year 2011-12 ..................................................................................................................................... 27 
Figure 14 Relationship between total size of Covid stimulus packages and the strictness of lockdowns, selected 




















List of Tables 
 
Table 1 Total arrivals in the agricultural markets between March 15 and June 30, selected crops, India, 2019 
and 2020 in tonne and per cent ........................................................................................................... 16 
Table 2 Selected indicators of labour force and employment, India, February to August 2020, in million and %
........................................................................................................................................................... 21 
Table 3 Forecasts for real GDP growth by different agencies, India, 2020-21, in per cent ............................... 23 
Table 4 Projected losses in Gross Value Added (GVA) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) due to Covid-19 
lockdown, India .................................................................................................................................. 25 

























Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic on the Indian Economy: A Critical 
Assessment 
 
R. Ramakumar and Tejal Kanitkar1 
 
This paper provides an analysis of the 
economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic 
in India. First, using secondary data 
published by various sources, the paper 
attempts to document the trajectory of the 
infections and the lockdown in India. 
Secondly, the paper explains the status of 
growth and development in the Indian 
economy over a decade prior to the 
pandemic. Thirdly, it describes the nature of 
impacts inflicted by the lockdown in the 
economy between March 2020 and August 
2020. Fourthly, it attempts to quantify the 
extent of economic losses in India using an 
Input-Output framework. Finally, it critically 
assesses the economic response of the Indian 




THE PANDEMIC AND THE 
ECONOMY 
 
The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the 
global economy has been profound. The 
global economy was slowing down prior to 
the pandemic, and levels of inequality were 
high (Gopinath, 2019). The number of 
unemployed persons in the world was rising 
over the years (ILO, 2019). Debt, particularly 
bad quality debt, was dangerously building up 
in every country (Wirz and Timiraos, 2020). 
It was, thus, on a fragile global economy that 
the pandemic first arrived in early weeks of 
2020.  
 
The pandemic necessitated the imposition of 
strict lockdowns in most countries. As a 
result, economic activities came to a halt. As 
factories and offices are temporarily closed, 
 
1 R. Ramakumar is NABARD Chair Professor at the School of Development Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 
Mumbai, India. Email: rr@tiss.edu. Tejal Kanitkar is Associate Professor at the School of Natural Sciences and 
Engineering, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru, India. Email: tejalk@nias.res.in. The authors thank 
J. Mohan Rao and T. Jayaraman for their support and encouragement. 
the production of goods and services 
declined. Supply chains were also severely 
disrupted. Thus, goods and services were not 
supplied in adequate quantities to meet the 
pre-existent demand. Concurrently, 
autonomous to the supply shock, a shrinkage 
took place on the demand side. As economic 
units were shut down, people lost jobs and 
wages. Due to the lockdown, consumers did 
not venture out to purchase or access goods 
and services. Thus, aggregate effective demand 
also fell.  
 
In short, the economic crisis induced by the 
pandemic was marked by an autonomous, 
concurrent and global decline in demand and 
supply. Given the exogeneous nature of the 
shock, the demand and supply shocks were 
independent in their origin. These shocks 
arose together in time. They also emerged in 
almost all the economies, leaving no region 
free to compensate for the shocks in other 
regions. Recent crises in the global economy 
were caused by either demand slowdowns or 
supply shocks or speculations in financial 
markets. The Covid-19 lockdown was unique 
in that both demand and supply fell. This was 
not a normal circumstance; rarely in history 
had such a convergence of demand and 
supply shocks occurred in all economies at 
the same time, and as a consequence of a 
non-economic, exogenous cause. 
 
While the demand and supply shocks arose 
independently of each other, these shocks 
had also a feedback relationship with each 
other in a theoretically indefinite loop. Every 
decline in supply or production implied a 
decline in demand due to lost jobs or unpaid 
wages – an illustration of the reverse multiplier 
effect. Given the fall in profits, reinvestment of 
capital also declined leading to another round 
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of demand depression. But each fall in 
demand also led to a fall in supply. In fact, in 
reality, one unit of fall in demand led to a fall 
in production or supply by more than one 
unit. In the logistics literature, this is called 
the supply bullwhip effect, where a small change 
in demand is extensively and 
disproportionately amplified as the signal is 
transmitted down the supply chain. 
 
The shocks to the real economy would surely 
spill over into the financial and external 
sectors. With reduced economic activity, debt 
repayments slow down. A prolonged 
lockdown could even lead to a banking and 
financial crisis. Sectors dependent on exports 
face a fall in export demand and prices. In 
sectors dependent on imports of 
intermediate goods or raw material, 
production is halted as inventories dry up. 
Remittances fall, reducing foreign exchange 
reserves. The pandemic, thus, extends from 
being a health crisis into becoming a global 
economic crisis as well. 
 
Two further points may be made. First, given 
the relationship between the pandemic and 
the enforcement of lockdown, any revival of 
the economy is also dependent on the 
“flattening” of the epidemic curve (Baldwin 
and Mauro, 2020). Only when the epidemic 
curves begin to flatten is the lockdown eased, 
and only then can economic activities be 
restarted. In other words, an early control of 
the spread of infections is important for an 
early revival of the economy.  
 
Secondly, till the lockdowns are fully lifted, 
governments cannot introduce classical 
Keynesian types of economic stimuli. The 
reason is that no demand revival measures 
are likely to be successful in the presence of 
supply declines and supply chain disruptions. 
Opinions differ on whether lockdowns 
should be blanket shutdowns, or calibrated to 
ensure protection of livelihoods. The 
scientific view is that while lockdowns may 
be necessary, two aspects of policy should be 
 
2 This directive was amended on the 8th of February 
2020 to allow the exports of surgical and disposable 
masks as well as gloves. 
prioritised: one, the lockdown period should 
be used to slowdown the spread of infections 
and expand testing and health infrastructure, 
which prepares the economy for a spread of 
infections afterwards. Two, a universal 
economic support package for the firms and 
people is essential during the lockdown 
including provision of financial support, 
ensuring food security and continued 
functioning of essential sectors and activities.  
 
Our analysis of the pandemic, the lockdown, 
its economic impacts and the response of the 
Indian government broadly follows the logic 
of the description above. In what follows, we 
shall take up each one of these aspects and 




THE TRAJECTORY OF THE 
PANDEMIC IN INDIA 
 
The first case of Covid-19 infection in India 
was reported on 30 January 2020. At that 
juncture, there were almost no restrictions in 
India on domestic or international travel or 
tourism. There were only two notable 
restrictions: one, international travellers from 
China were screened at the airports and two, 
a ban was imposed on the exports of personal 
protective equipment (PPE).2 Later, in early-
February 2020, the National Disaster 
Management Authority (NDMA) released 
guidelines to all States on the nature of 
awareness campaigns to be undertaken 
through the media. These campaigns 
included the advocacy for face masks and 
hand sanitisers as well as the need to avoid 
travel and large gatherings.  
 
Three major limitations of the Indian policy 
in these early days have to be underlined. 
First, even in early-February 2020, screening 
and surveillance of international travellers 
were applicable only for in-bound passengers 
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from China, even though many other nations 
were also reporting Covid-19 cases.3 In fact, 
it was only from 26 February 2020 that India 
started screening passengers from other 
hotspots like Italy, Iran and South Korea. 
Official data show that between 15 January 
and 18 March 2020, about 7.8 million 
international passengers arrived in India. 
However, only about 1.5 million of them (or 
19 per cent) were subjected to screening or 
surveillance. 
 
Secondly, adherence to the advisories on 
avoiding mass gatherings was poor. Two 
events attracted particular attention. On 24 
February 2020, during the official visit of 
President Donald Trump, a massive road-
show and a public meeting was organised in 
the city of Ahmedabad in the Indian State of 
Gujarat. About 100,000 people participated 
in this official event. In March and April 
2020, Ahmedabad was a hotspot of Covid-19 
infections. On 15 and 16 March 2020, an 
international conference was organised in 
Delhi by the Tablighi Jamaat, a religious 
organisation. About 250 delegates from 
outside India, including from hotspots in 
Malaysia and Indonesia, participated. This 
congregation was a major spreader of 
infections across the country. On both 
occasions, the government failed to strictly 
impose its own guidelines.  
 
Thirdly, while the need to increase the 
manufacture of PPE was recognised the 
world over, the Government of India did not 
respond in time. The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) noted on 27 February 
2020 that the global stock of PPEs, gowns 
and goggles was “insufficient”. India’s 
Ministry of Textiles estimated on 18 March 
2020 that India required about 725,000 
coveralls and about 6 million N-95 masks, 
both of which were in short supply. But 
according to the Preventive Wear 
Manufacturer Association of India 
(PWMAI), they received the government’s 
 
3 This was despite the advisory issued by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), on 24 January 2020, 
noting that the virus may spread globally from regions 
outside China also. 
guidelines on the specifications of equipment 
only on 21 March 2020. By then, however, 
the lockdowns were in effect and the 
manufacturers were less able to respond 
effectively to the rising demand for PPE. 
 
By March 2020, the pandemic was spreading 
fast. On 18 March 2020, the government 
formed a national task force with 21 health 
experts. However, no details of discussions 
within this task force or their 
recommendations are public till date. By 20 
March 2020, many States announced 
shutdowns of various degrees. About 75 to 
80 districts out of the 739 districts – 
identified as hotspot districts – were 
completely shut down, with only essential 
services allowed to function. On 22 March 
2020, all train services, air services and inter-
State bus services were suspended.  
 
The national lockdown 
 
By 23 March 2020, the impression provided 
by the government was that it intended to 
shut down only the hotspot districts to 
contain the spread of the virus. However, on 
24 March 2020, the Prime Minister appeared 
on national television at 8 PM and 
announced that the whole country was being 
locked down for 21 days from midnight that 
day. After 21 days, the lockdown was 
extended till 3 May 2020, and then again first 
till 17th and then till 31st May 2020. 
 
As we emphasised, a lockdown may be 
necessary to meet the immediate needs of 
addressing the pandemic. We do not agree 
with the argument that a lockdown was 
unnecessary, and that large-scale testing, 
quarantine and monitoring would have 
sufficed. On the contrary, a lockdown helps 
in slowing down the spread of infections. It 
provides time to the governments to expand 
health and quarantine facilities, intensify 
testing and contact tracing and be prepared 
for a surge afterwards. The governments 
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should, also, ensure that all essential services 
are maintained, firms are allowed economic 
leeway to survive the lockdown period and 
people are provided relief and basic needs 
like food and, possibly, a cash transfer.  
 
India’s announcement of a national 
lockdown, however, appeared more like a 
shock-and-awe tactic rather than part of a 
well-thought out plan. Just as the tactic 
means in military parlance, India’s lockdown 
was designed more to help the government 
achieve rapid dominance over its people, 
using the force of power and leaving them 
“stunned, confused, overwhelmed, and 
paralysed”. It was imposed without adequate 
warning and was not backed up by any 
transparent and scientifically sound 
statement of intent. 
 
Beginning from 25 March 2020, India was 
totally shut down. The government 
announced that a set of essential services 
would be allowed to operate, but reports 
from the ground indicated that most essential 
services were adversely hit (Narayanan and 
Saha, 2020). The guidelines regarding the 
lockdown were handed down from the 
centre to the States, and the States were given 
little flexibility in deciding the guidelines 
based on the contexts of implementation. 
Almost all economic enterprises were closed 
and the mobility of people was halted. Police 
force was extensively used to ensure strict 
implementation of the lockdown.  
 
We ask two questions as we try to assess 
India’s lockdown from a public health 
perspective. One, did the lockdown help the 
government to contain the pandemic? Two, 
did the government use the lockdown to 
improve health infrastructure?  
 
The lockdown and the spread of infections 
 
India is a densely populated country with 
inadequate housing, sanitation facilities and 
public transport. When the lockdown was 
announced on the 24th of March 2020, India 
had only 571 confirmed infections. During 
the lockdown, the testing rates had to be 
raised, the infected had to be identified and 
quarantined in time, contacts of the infected 
had to be traced and monitored and social 
distancing and the use of sanitisers had to be 
universalised. The curve had to be 
“flattened”. 
 
There are two positives in the Indian 
experience with lockdowns (see Figure 1). 
First, India’s lockdown was partly successful 
in slowing down the spread of confirmed 
infections. The total number of confirmed 
infections per day rose from 119 on 23 March 
to only 1718 by 30 April, 7964 by 30 May and 
18,522 by 30 June. In other words, India had 
the opportunity to expand its health 
preparedness over these three months. Of 
course, it is impossible to build a 
counterfactual to judge whether the virus 
would have spread faster in the absence of a 
lockdown or whether a partial lockdown of 
hotspots alone would have been a more 
effective and efficient use of the already 
thinly stretched resources. In a situation of 
crises, the formulation and implementation 
of public policies are a challenging exercise in 
trial and error and learning-by-doing. Still, in 
the absence of the lockdown, the absolute 
number of infections in India would have in 
all likelihood surpassed that of every other 
country in April 2020 itself. 
 
Secondly, the death rates in India have also 
been lower than for other countries. On 24 
March 2020, the number of daily deaths in 
India was just two, which rose to only 67 by 
30 April, 265 by 30 May, 418 by 30 June, 775 
by 30 July, 948 by 30 August. For a country 
of India’s size, the number of deaths was a 
major comfort, allowing the government 
extraordinary political space to focus on 
scientifically sound policies.  
 
At the same time, important qualifications 
are in order. Number of infections are 
dependent on the extent of testing; the less 
you test, less is our ability to detect infections. 
A major concern raised by public health 
scholars is that the extent of testing in India 
was lower than in other countries. The 
number of tests per million in India was 
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lower than 100 till 10 June 2020, or about two 
and a half months after the lockdown began. 
It was after mid-June that the number of 
confirmed infections in India began to rise 
decisively i.e., after the number of tests per 
million crossed 100. It was only after 13th and 
26th July 2020 that the number of tests per 
million crossed the next milestones of 200 
and 300 respectively. Once India crossed 250 
tests per million, its test positivity rate 
crossed 10. The test positivity rate fell back 
to below 10 only in the first week of August 
2020 and remained so afterwards. As on 30 
August 2020, the number of tests per million 
in India (about 610 per million) was still 
lower than in many other countries. Clearly, 
India failed to test higher numbers between 
March and mid-June 2020.  
 
Figure 1 Daily numbers of confirmed cases, number of deaths and number of tests, India, United States and Brazil, 
December 2019 to August 2020 
  
Figure 1a Daily new confirmed Covid-19 cases, 7-day 
rolling average, Y-axis on linear scale 
Figure 1b Daily new confirmed Covid-19 cases per 
million population, 7-day rolling average, Y-axis on 
linear scale 
  
Figure 1c Daily new confirmed Covid-19 deaths per 
million people, 7-day rolling average, Y-axis on linear 
scale 
Figure 1d Daily new Covid-19 tests per 1,000 people, 7-
day rolling average, Y-axis on linear scale 
Source: Computed from Our World in Data, https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-data-explorer.  
 
On 30 August 2020, India did not appear 
anywhere close to flattening the curve. On 30 
August, India had 78,761 new confirmed 
cases per day. The total number of cases was 
rising, and was one of the highest in the 
world alongside United States and Brazil. 
Even when we normalise the number of new 
confirmed cases per million, the number of 
cases in India was rising rapidly, though the 
figure was lower than that of United States 
and Brazil. If we consider the number of new 
deaths per day, India again was right at the 
top with United States and Brazil on 30 
August 2020. However, when we normalise 
the number of new deaths per million, the 
Indian figures, though rising, were lower than 
for most other countries. The only solace was 
that the number of tests were slowly rising 
and that the test positivity rate had fallen 
below 9.  
 
Some regions of India, such as the state of 
Kerala, were able to effectively contain the 
virus through stringent testing and contact 
tracing (for details, see Thomas Isaac and 
Sadanandan, 2020; Swaminathan and 
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Johnson, 2020). States like Kerala were also 
able to keep the death rate lower than the 
national average due to the better quality of 
public healthcare systems, decentralised 
health governance and effective reverse 
quarantine measures. But major cities in the 
country, such as Mumbai, Delhi, 
Ahmedabad, and Chennai, were witnessing a 
rapid rise in cases despite the strict lockdown. 
 
In summary, while India’s lockdown may 
have slowed down the growth of infections 
and kept death rates low, the rising numbers 
delayed the opening up of the economy (see 
Sundararaman and Ranjan, 2020). As we shall 
discuss, the economic cost of the long 
lockdown was considerable. 
 
Health preparedness during the lockdown 
 
India was poorly equipped to deal with the 
pandemic in March 2020. India’s major 
health indicators are inferior to not just the 
developed world, but also its compatriots in 
the club of emerging economies and South 
Asia (Dreze and Sen, 2013). Poor health 
indicators in India are the outcome of an 
underdeveloped public health system. While 
the ratio of health expenditure to GDP is 
more than 3 per cent in the developed world, 
the corresponding ratio in India in 2018-19 
was only 1.3 per cent. As a result, India has a 
skeletal work force in the public health 
sector. It has only 0.85 physicians per 1000 
people, 0.70 beds per 1000 people, 0.58 
community health workers per 1000 people 
and 1.72 nurses and mid-wives per 1000 
people.4  
 
Given the poor level of health preparedness, 
India was forced to quickly increase the 
number of hospital beds, ventilators, doctors, 
nurses, care staff, spaces for quarantine, 
laboratories and health workers to undertake 
testing and contact tracing.5 According to the 
government, it had put in place 3027 
dedicated Covid-19 hospitals and 7013 care 
 
4 See https://data.worldbank.org/.  
centres across the country by the end of May 
2020. Further, there were 0.28 million 
isolation beds, 31,250 ICU beds and 1,09,888 
oxygen-supported beds in these hospitals and 
centres. All these were indeed improvements 
over March 2020. However, as infections 
began to rise exponentially by May and June 
2020, the weaknesses of India’s health system 
were exposed. Reports emerged of hospitals 
unable to accommodate adequate number of 
patients, mortuaries with little space to hold 
dead bodies and doctors and nurses 
struggling without adequate number of PPE 
kits.  
 
The key problem in India during the 
lockdown was the inability of the historically 
underinvested public health system to cope 
with the rising intensity of the pandemic. 
Accumulated under-preparedness spilled 
over into the inability to ramp up health 
infrastructure at short notice. 
 
III 
THE PANDEMIC AND THE 
INDIAN ECONOMY 
 
As with the world economy, Indian economy 
too was faced with multiple constraints when 
the pandemic emerged. In this section, we 
shall outline the major features of the crisis in 
the Indian economy prior to the pandemic 
before discussing the economic situation 
after March 2020.  
 
Indian economy before Covid-19 
 
A key feature of India’s economic growth 
performance after independence was the 
relatively low levels of economic growth rate. 
Beginning from the 1950s till the 1970s, 
India’s economy grew at about 3 per cent per 
annum. Scholars across the world called it 
“the Hindu growth rate”. The economy 
5 The private health sector was incapable of 
participating in the fight against Covid-19. Many 




finally moved up from the average annual 
growth rate of 3 per cent only by the 1980s; 
the economic growth rate in this decade 
averaged 5.6 per cent. Thus, the Indian 
economy had moved into a higher growth 
path in the 1980s itself as compared to the 
first three decades after independence (see 
Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2002). 
 
From 1991, India began liberalising its 
economy in response to a balance of 
payments crisis. Over the first decade of 
economic reforms – between 1992-93 and 
2002-03 – the rate of growth of the economy 
was 6.1 per cent, which was only marginally 
higher than the growth rate for the 1980s 
(RBI, 2003). In other words, the growth rates 
of GDP did not show a significant 
acceleration in the 1990s compared to the 
1980s.  
 
The next stage of growth in the economy 
began by around 2002-03 (see Figure 2). Due 
to a number of fortuitous international and 
national circumstances, the economic growth 
rate rose to an average of 8 to 10 per cent per 
quarter between 2003-04 and 2011-12, except 
in the midst of the global financial crisis of 
2007-08 and 2008-09 (see also Nagaraj, 
2013). This phase of growth was backed by a 
corresponding rise in an array of 
macroeconomic indicators. The investment 
rate grew from 27.2 per cent in 2003 to 40.2 
per cent in 2011 (Figure 3). The savings rate 
grew from 26.8 per cent in 2003 to 36.9 per 
cent in 2011. The share of the value of 
exports in the GDP grew from 10.2 per cent 
in 2003 to 16.6 per cent in 2011 (Figure 4). 
On an average, the annual percentage growth 
in merchandise exports was 25 to 30 per cent 
between 2005-06 and 2011-12. Domestic 
credit supply was growing at about 11.1 per 
cent per month in April 2004, but gradually 
 
6 As per the earlier methodology (with base year 2004-
05), the Central Statistics Office (CSO) used to release 
estimates for GDP at factor cost. GDP at factor cost 
included all payments for the factors of production 
(rent, wages, interest, profits, dividends and other 
costs). A major change in the method of estimation 
under the new base year of 2011-12 was the 
introduction of the concept of Gross Value Added 
(GVA) at basic prices. GVA at basic prices was taken 
rose to 27.1 per cent in July 2009 and 20.3 per 
cent in March 2011 (Figure 5).  
 
These improvements in the macroeconomy 
were reflected in the levels of living of 
people, even if marginal. Reports of the 
National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) of 
the government show that there was a decline 
in unemployment from 2.3 per cent in 2004-
05 to 2 per cent in 2009-10 and 2.2 per cent 
in 2011-12 (Figure 6). The levels of poverty 
also fell from 37.2 per cent in 2004-05 to 21.9 
per cent in 2011-12 (Figure 7). 
 
The trends were reversed in the years after 
2011-12. One problem that arises while 
analysing economic growth in India after 
2011-12 is the change in the base year of 
national accounts statistics from 2004-05 to 
2011-12.6 In the past, changes in base years 
did not present any methodological difficulty, 
as temporal comparability was ensured. 
However, the change of base year to 2011-12 
was accompanied by fundamental changes 
too, which hampered comparability. For 
instance, the database on the organised 
private sector used in the estimation of GDP 
was changed from the Annual Survey of 
Industries (ASI) to the list of companies 
registered with the Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs, called MCA-21. Due to these 
changes, we have not followed a uniform 
base year for our plot in Figure 2. Instead, we 
have separately presented the Gross Value 
Added (GVA) series prior to 2011-12 with 
base year 2004-05 and after 2011-12 with 
base year 2011-12.  
 
After 2011-12, GVA showed a rising trend 
till the first quarter of 2016-17 (Figure 2). 
From the second quarter of 2016-17, the 
GVA began to fall. It fell from 9.3 per cent 
in Q1 of 2016-17 to 3.5 per cent in Q3 of 
as the indicator of economic activity from the supply 
side. It was arrived at by adding the net indirect 
production taxes (i.e., indirect taxes – subsidies on 
production) to the earlier concept of GDP at factor 
cost. From the supply side indicator of GVA at basic 
prices, GDP at market prices, the indicator of 
economic activity from the demand side, was arrived 
at by adding to it the net indirect product taxes (i.e., 




Figure 2 Year-on-year growth rates of Gross Value Added 
(GVA) at basic price, India, quarterly series, 2004-05 and 
2011-12 base years, in per cent 
Figure 3 Investment rate and savings rate, India, annual, 
2003 to 2019, in per cent to GDP 
Figure 4 Share of exports values in GDP and growth of 
merchandise exports, India, 2005-06 to 2019-20, in per 
cent 
   
Source: CEIC Database Source: CEIC Database Source: CMIE Database 
   
Figure 5 Monthly growth rates in domestic credit supply, 
India, 2004 to 2020, in per cent 
Figure 6 Unemployment rates, India, 2004-05 to 2018-19, 
principal plus subsidiary status, in per cent 
Figure 7 Head count ratios of income poverty, India, 1993-
94 to 2017-18, in per cent 
   














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2019-20 and 3 per cent in Q4 of 2019-20. 
One of the triggers for this decline was the 
ill-conceived demonetisation of Rs 500 and 
Rs 1000 notes in November 2016, which 
sucked out about 86 per cent of the cash in 
the economy in just a few hours 
(Ramakumar, 2017). 
 
While the new GVA series shows a rise till 
2016-17 and a fall afterwards, economists 
have questioned the veracity of the rise of 
GVA growth rate between 2011-12 and 
2016-17. A number of macroeconomic 
indicators universally associated with a rise in 
economic growth had begun to decline from 
2011-12 itself. The investment rate fell from 
40.2 per cent in 2011 to 32.1 in 2016-17 and 
31.7 per cent in 2019-20 (Figure 3). The 
savings rate fell from 36.9 per cent in 2011 to 
31.1 per cent in 2016-17 and 30.1 per cent in 
2019-20.  
 
The share of exports in the GDP fell from 
16.6 per cent in 2011 to 11.9 per cent in 2016 
and 11.5 per cent in 2019 (Figure 4). The rate 
of growth of exports, which averaged 25 to 
30 per cent between 2005-06 and 2011-12 fell 
to between 5 and 9 per cent per year after 
2011-12. The monthly growth rate of 
domestic bank credit fell from 27.1 per cent 
in the July 2009 to 6.3 per cent in March 2015 
and 7.3 per cent in March 2020 (Figure 5). 
 
The slowdown of GVA growth after 2011-12 
had a direct impact on the lives of people. 
First, there was a sharp rise in the 
unemployment rate from 2.2 per cent in 
2011-12 to 6.1 per cent in 2017-18 and 5.8 
per cent in 2018-19 (Figure 6). The 
unemployment rates recorded for 2017-18 
and 2018-19 were the highest rates recorded 
over the previous four decades.  
 
Secondly, there was a rise in the levels of 
income poverty from 21.9 per cent in 2011-
12 to 22.8 per cent in 2017-18 (Figure 7). In 
fact, this was the first rise in the absolute 
poverty levels in India after the early-1970s. 
The rise in rural poverty was steeper than for 
rural and urban areas put together; rural 
poverty rates rose from 25.7 per cent in 2011-
12 to 29.6 per cent in 2017-18. 
 
In summary, the Indian economy was 
gradually slowing down after 2011-12, and 
particularly so after 2016-17. While the GVA 
growth rates show a decline only after 2016-
17, the range of economic indicators usually 
associated with economic growth had begun 
to decline from 2011-12 itself. In particular, 
the fall of investment rates and domestic 
credit growth are likely to have considerably 
eroded India’s manufactural and 
infrastructural capacities over the last decade.  
 
There was also clear evidence that these 
changes were accompanied by a sharp 
contraction of demand. On the one hand, the 
growth of real rural wages stagnated after 
2016-17; it even recorded negative growth 
rates in many quarters. On the other hand, 
the manufacturing capacity utilisation fell 
from about 79 per cent in 2010-11 to about 
72 per cent by 2016-17 and about 70 per cent 
in 2019-20 (RBI, 2020).  
 
Though the presence of a demand slowdown 
was unmistakable, the Union government 
consistently refused to adopt a counter-
cyclical fiscal policy. As Figure 8 shows, the 
ratio of Union government’s expenditure to 
the GDP fell between 2011-12 and 2018-19. 
The government remained wedded to the 
ideological orthodoxy of fiscal consolidation 
in this period. Fiscal deficit had turned into a 
holy cow in this orthodoxy; any rise in fiscal 
deficit, it was argued, would scare away 
private foreign investors (Patnaik, 2019).  
 
The fall of public expenditure was also an 
indicator of the increasing withdrawal of the 
state from economic activities under the 
neoliberal policy regime. Many economists, 
and even business associations, argued that 
the slowdown in the economy was structural, 
an outcome of poor aggregate demand and 
necessitated a pump-priming of the economy 
(see Chandrasekhar, 2019). But these 




Thus, when the pandemic struck, Indian 
economy was already in a vulnerable 
position. 
 
Lockdown and the economy: Nature of impacts 
 
The national lockdown, which began on 25 
March 2020, crippled economic activities 
across the country. The economic crisis 
precipitated by the lockdown was marked on 
the demand and supply sides. These shocks 
also reverberated across all the three sectors 
of the economy. On the supply side, the 
lockdown led to the shutdown of factories, 
firms and offices everywhere. In the primary 
and secondary sectors, there were reductions 
in supply (due to stoppage of production) as 
well as disruptions in the supply chain, which 
restricted movement of goods.  
 
Figure 8 Expenditure of the Union government as a share of GDP, India, 2004 to 2020, in per cent 
 
 




The lockdown began when the harvest of 
India’s second agricultural crop season (rabi) 
had begun. The harvest of crops in March, 
April and May 2020 was adversely affected 
due to two reasons: one, the disruptions in 
the agricultural supply chains; and two, the 
lack of adequate number of agricultural 
labourers, many of whom were migrant 
workers (for detailed analysis, see 
Ramakumar, 2020).  
 
On the one hand, international trade was shut 
down. Thousands of containers were piled 
up in ports. Movement of goods through 
ports was adversely affected because of a 
shortage of workers to load and unload, a 
shortage of containers and the failure of 
importers to pay the import detention 
charges to the global container shipping lines. 
 
On the other hand, domestic procurement 
systems were not operational in many 
regions. Even when the procurement centres 
were open, farmers struggled to bring their 
produce to the market yards due to poor 
availability of transport facilities and 
restrictions on movement of goods. Even 
where farmers were able to transport their 
produce to the market, they needed an 
invitation or appointment slip from the 
Market Board, which slowed down the entire 
procurement process. Further, procurement 
centres in many States refused to accept more 
than a specified quantity of produce per day. 
In the case of perishables, many farmers did 















































Total expenditure/GDP Revenue expenditure/GDP Capital expenditure/GDP
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of harvesting. Others were reported to be 
dumping their harvest of vegetables and 
fruits. 
 
In many States, wholesale markets either 
closed down or were operational only for two 
or three days a week. Many large private 
traders were also not operational during the 
lockdown because of disruptions in truck 
services. According to one report, in early-
April 2020, about 500,000 trucks were stuck 
in different highways of India as they could 
not cross state borders or were stopped by 
the police for technical reasons related to 
permissions. As a result, trucks were in 
shortage. When trucks were available, truck 
drivers were not available as many had 
returned home before the lockdown.  
 
The broken supply chains drastically reduced 
market arrivals of agricultural goods in India.  
In this paper, we use data for 15 commodities 
from the database of the Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), which 
puts together data from 3289 markets across 
the country. These commodities are paddy, 
wheat, barley, gram, pigeon pea, lentil, 
potato, tomato, onion, cabbage, cauliflower, 
peas, lady’s finger, banana and mango. These 
crops represent all types of crop groups, such 
as cereals, pulses, fruits and vegetables, and 
crops that are specifically important for the 
rabi season. Table 1 provides data on the total 
market arrivals of these 15 commodities 
between two dates: March 15 and June 30 for 




Table 1 Total arrivals in the agricultural markets between March 15 and June 30, selected crops, India, 2019 
and 2020 in tonne and per cent 
Crop 
Total arrivals between 
March 15 and June 
30, 2019 (in tonnes) 
Total arrivals 
between March 15 




in 2020 and 
2019 (in tonnes) 
Arrivals in 2020 
as per cent of 
arrivals in 2019 
(%) 
Paddy 29,05,418 27,17,162 -1,88,257 93.5 
Wheat 2,01,85,942 1,24,33,927 -77,52,014 61.6 
Barley 4,46,930 2,38,934 -2,07,997 53.5 
Gram 20,96,710 8,12,194 -12,84,516 38.7 
Pigeon pea 3,48,473 1,63,093 -1,85,380 46.8 
Lentil 2,48,903 2,15,300 -33,603 86.5 
Potato 32,51,382 17,00,994 -15,50,388 52.3 
Tomato 7,38,216 6,58,532 -79,684 89.2 
Onion 43,64,300 16,77,379 -26,86,921 38.4 
Cabbage 1,76,559 1,15,976 -60,584 65.7 
Cauliflower 1,88,100 1,10,392 -77,708 58.7 
Peas 1,18,896 50,633 -68,263 42.6 
Lady’s finger 1,55,505 1,13,759 -41,746 73.2 
Banana 5,46,608 4,82,107 -64,501 88.2 
Mango 7,61,645 3,28,616 -4,33,029 43.1 
Source: Computed from the CMIE commodities database.  
 
For the period examined, market arrivals of 
all crops, except maize, were lower in 2020 
than in 2019 both in the aggregate and for 
most days during the lockdown. It was only 
in paddy, lentil, tomato and banana that 
market arrivals in 2020 constituted more than 
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75 per cent of market arrivals in 2019. In the 
case of wheat, barley, potato, cauliflower, 
cabbage and lady’s finger, market arrivals in 
2020 were between 50 and 75 per cent of 
market arrivals in 2019. For the remaining 
crops, such as gram, pigeon pea, onion, peas 
and mango, market arrivals in 2020 were less 
than half of the market arrivals in 2019. In 
wheat, the most important rabi crop, only 
61.6 per cent of the arrivals in 2019 were 
recorded in 2020. The lowest ratio was 
recorded for onion, where only 38.4 per cent 





India is largely self-sufficient in milk, and is 
not dependent on imports. During the 
lockdown, many regular consumers of milk 
like sweet shops, restaurants and hotels were 
shut. The demand for milk is estimated to 
have fallen by 20-25 per cent during the 
lockdown (GoI, 2020). As a result, milk sales 
declined, and the differential between milk 
procurement and sale widened by about 30 
per cent at the national level. Many milk 
dairies were forced to announce milk 
holidays. Data on milk procurement by milk 
unions and federations in India show that 
liquid milk procurement fell from 534.2 lakh 
litres per day (llpd) in the first two weeks of 
March 2020 to 503.9 llpd by the last two 
weeks of May 2020. The sale of milk also 
declined from 386.9 llpd in the first half of 
March 2020 to 347.5 llpd by the last two 
weeks of May 2020. 
 
India is the second largest exporter of beef in 
the world, after Brazil. It is the top supplier 
of beef to Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as 
the West Asian region. It exports about 
100,000 tonnes of buffalo meat every month, 
but exports in March 2020 were estimated to 
have fallen to 40,000 tonnes. Sales fell 
domestically too. On the supply side, 
sufficient animals could not be transported 
from the source areas to large abattoirs. Many 
abattoirs closed down.  
 
Poultry producers in India were adversely 
affected at multiple levels: small growers in 
homesteads, layer nursery owners and broiler 
farms. Broiler birds, whose life span is about 
30 to 40 days on an average, began to pile up 
in the farms and growers were forced to keep 
feeding them with purchased poultry feed. 
The supply of poultry feed itself was 
disrupted by the lockdown. As broiler birds 
grew in size as well as in numbers, and as the 
markets for their sale shrank, growers 
incurred major financial losses. As a result, 
birds were culled on a large scale. According 
to the Poultry Federation of India, most 
poultry businesses in India were running at 
30 to 35 per cent of their stocks in early-April 
2020. According to the All India Poultry 
Breeders Association, the total loss for the 





The most important indicator of industrial 
sector growth is the index of industrial 
production (IIP). Monthly IIP data for 2019 
and 2020, at the base year 2011-12, are 
presented in Figure 9. The IIP, which stood 
at 134.2 in February 2020 fell by 53.6 in April 
2020. While it rose in May, June and July 
2020, it continued to be considerably below 
the levels in February 2020 or July 2019. If 
we consider IIP for manufacturing alone, the 
decline was steeper. 
 
A survey of 317 firms by the Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
between 15th and 19th March 2020 had shown 
the initial signs of stress. Even at this early 
stage, about 53 per cent of the businesses 
surveyed had responded that the impact on 
them was likely to be “very high” or “high” 
(FICCI, 2020). About 73 per cent of the 
businesses said there was likely to be a “big” 
reduction in orders; 35 per cent reported a 
rise in inventories; and 81 per cent reported a 
“significant” impact on cash flows. About 52 
per cent indicated that the delay in sourcing 





Figure 9 Index of Industrial Production (IIP), India, monthly, 2019 and 2020, base year 2011-12=100 
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. 
 
We also use three indirect indicators of 
industrial activity: the total collection of 
goods and services tax (GST), the total 
movement of goods through the Indian 
Railway’s freight services and total exports. 
First, there was fall by one-third in the total 
GST collections in India between February 
and April 2020 (Figure 10). The collections 
rose in May and June 2020, but the reason 
was delayed filings of GST returns (which 
was allowed by the government). The 
cumulative shortfall of GST collections 
between March and August 2020 was Rs 1.64 
lakh crore compared to March-August 2019. 
This shortfall was about 27 per cent of the 
GST collection between March and August 
2019.  
 





Secondly, the total quantity of revenue-
earning freight moved by the Indian Railways 
was lower between March and August 2020 
compared to March and August 2019 as well 
as in February 2020 (Figure 11). The fall was 
most severe in April 2020. The freight traffic 
in August 2020 appears higher than in August 
2019, but freight traffic between July 2020 
and August 2020 fell in absolute terms from 
95,180 tonnes to 94,360 tonnes. If we 
consider the period between March to 
August 2020, the cumulative freight 
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about 14 per cent) than between March and 
August 2019. 
 
Thirdly, India’s exports also fell after 
February 2020 (Figure 12). The value of 
exports fell from $27,729 million in February 
2020 to $10,271 million by April 2020 before  
improving gradually to $23,644 million by 
July 2020. If we consider the period between 
March and July 2020, the value of exports 
was lower by $43,663 million (or about 32 per 













If we consider India’s total non-farm work 
force, about 40 per cent of them are engaged 
in micro, small and medium enterprises 








































































J A N U A R Y F E B R U A R Y M A R C H A P R I L M A Y J U N E J U L Y A U G U S T S E P T E M B E R O C T O B E R N O V E M B E R D E C E M B E R
Value of exports, 2019 Value of exports, 2020
20 
 
million MSMEs employ about 110 million 
workers (GAME, 2020). They contribute 33 
per cent of the total manufacturing output 
and 25 per cent of the GDP from services. It 
was in the MSME sector that the impact of 
the lockdown was most severe. The total 
losses in this sector are estimated to be about 
Rs 0.8 to 1.2 trillion in profits.  
 
A survey of MSMEs by FICCI in April 2020 
showed that about 73 per cent of the MSMEs 
reported a drop in orders (GAME, 2020). In 
addition, about 50 per cent of the MSMEs 
reported a rise in inventory levels by more 
than 15 per cent. Another survey by the All 
India Manufacturers’ Organisation in May 
2020 covered 46,525 companies (AIMO, 
2020). It showed that about 35 per cent of the 
MSMEs reported their future as “beyond 
recovery”; they had “no chance of recovery” 
and had begun “shutting down their 
operations”. Another 39 per cent reported 
their recovery to be at least six months away. 
Yet another survey in July 2020 by the Global 
Alliance for Mass Entrepreneurship 
(GAME) and Krea University, covering 1500 
micro-enterprises, showed that 57 per cent of 
the micro-enterprises had no cash reserves, 
and 65 per cent of them had to access 
finances from personal savings to continue 
operations. About 40 per cent of the 
enterprises had already borrowed capital to 
survive; among them, only 14 per cent used a 
formal source of borrowing (GAME, 2020). 
 
In sum, the impact of the pandemic on the 
industrial sector, especially the small and 
microenterprises, was severe. Unlike in 
agriculture, a third of the industrial firms 
affected by the lockdown are likely to shut 
down permanently. For most industrialists, 
real recovery may not begin at least till 
November-December 2020.  
 
Impact on employment 
 
The economic shutdown after March 2020 
led to a major rise in unemployment. 
Monthly data on employment and 
unemployment are collected and published 
by the CMIE. Their surveys show striking 
results (see Table 2).  
 
First, seekers of employment exited the 
labour force in large numbers in March and 
April 2020. The size of the labour force 
shrank by 1.4 per cent in March 2020 and 15 
per cent in April 2020. There was some 
recovery from May 2020, but the total size of 
the labour force in July and August 2020 were 
still lower than in February 2020 by about 16 
million and 12 million persons respectively. 
 
Secondly, the total number of employed 
persons shrank at a faster rate than the labour 
force. There was a fall of employed persons 
by 2.5 per cent in March 2020 and 29 per cent 
in April 2020. Despite recovery after May 
2020, the number of employed persons were 
less by 13.5 million in August 2020 compared 
to February 2020.  
 
Thirdly, there appears to be a “discouraged 
worker effect” in the labour force after the 
pandemic. The number of persons actively 
looking for employment rose from 34.2 
million in February 2020 to 93.1 million in 
May 2020, but fell to 35.7 million by August 
2020. However, the number of unemployed 
persons not looking for employment rose 
eight times between February 2020 and April 
2020. It fell back to 13 million by August 
2020, which was higher by about 2.6 million 
persons than in February 2020. 
 
Fourthly, unemployment rose. The monthly 
unemployment rate, which was about 7.8 per 
cent in February 2020, rose to 23.5 per cent 
in April and May 2020 before falling to 8.4 
per cent by August 2020. However, this was 
no reason for solace, as large numbers had 
already exited the labour force. The impact of 
unemployment was most severe on the 
historically disadvantaged and oppressed 
sections of India’s society: Scheduled Caste 
(SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) persons. The 
unemployment rate among SC persons was 
lower than for all persons in February 2020. 
But between March 2020 and August 2020, it 



















Labour force (million) 440.1 433.8 369.0 396.5 420.0 424.3 428.3 
Labour participation rate 
(%) 
42.6 41.9 35.6 38.2 40.3 40.7 40.9 
Employed persons 
(million) 
406.0 395.8 282.2 303.4 373.8 392.7 392.5 
Unemployed persons 
actively looking for 
employment (million) 
34.2 37.9 86.8 93.1 46.2 31.5 35.7 
Unemployed persons not 
actively looking for 
employment (million) 
10.4 16.3 88.6 50.0 31.8 15.5 13.0 
Unemployment rate (%) 7.8 8.8 23.5 23.5 10.9 7.4 8.4 
Unemployment rate for 
Scheduled Caste groups 
(%) 
7.2 9.4 31.9 33.8 15.2 8.6 8.5 
Unemployment rate for 
Scheduled Tribe groups 
(%) 
6.4 4.3 18.7 23.3 8.2 3.0 4.5 
Source: CMIE 
 
Fifthly, the impact on employment was not 
limited to the informal sector, but also the 
formal sector. The total number of salaried 
jobs in India, as per the CMIE surveys, was 
86.1 million in 2019-20 (Vyas, 2020a). In 
April 2020, this number fell to 68.4 million; 
by August 2020, it had further fallen to 64.9 
million. In other words, there was a 24 per 
cent decline in salaried jobs during the 
lockdown.  
 
Finally, age group-wise data show that young 
job seekers were the most acutely hit. The 
largest losses in employment were in the age 
group 15-39 years (Vyas, 2020b). Persons in 
the age group of 20-24 years constituted only 
9 per cent of the total employment but 
accounted for 35 per cent of the total 
employment losses. Persons in the age group 
of 25-29 years were only 11 per cent of the 
total employment but accounted for 46 per 
cent of all the job losses. 
 
Lockdown and migrant workers 
 
A visible demonstration of the harshness of 
the lockdown was in the plight of migrant 
workers. Census data for 2011 show that 
there are more than 142 million “migrant 
workers” in India. Of them, about 30 million 
migrant workers were located in other 
districts of their own State, while about 19 
million migrant workers were located in a 
different State. The announcement of the 
lockdown with a notice period of just four 
hours set off a panic reaction. Millions of 
migrant workers disregarded the lockdown 
and began travel to the safety of their homes. 
As bus and train services were suspended, 
these workers moved alone or in groups 
either by foot or in bicycles (Srivastava, 
2020). The summer had begun, and more 
than 100 persons died on the roads due to 
starvation and exhaustion.  
 
As the tragedy of the return journeys of 
migrant workers unravelled, the Union 
government directed the State governments 
to house the migrant workers in temporary 
shelters and provide them food. Later, on 19 
April 2020, the government allowed intra-
State travel of migrant workers, but 
continued the ban on inter-State travel. In 
early-April 2020, a number of concerned 
citizens approached the Supreme Court to 
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intervene. Unfortunately, the court did not 
pass any order till June 2020. In the 
meanwhile, on 1 May 2020, special inter-State 
trains were announced for migrant workers 
to return home – called shramik trains. 
According to the government, between 1st 
May and 3rd June 2020, 4228 shramik trains 
ran, transporting 5.7 million workers. This 
was just a trickle compared to the total 
number of migrant workers, though it came 
as a relief to many. Further, these trains were 
poorly equipped to deal with the large 
number of passengers, and reports indicate 
that more than 80 persons died in these trains 




QUANTIFICATION OF THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT 
 
In this section, we attempt an exercise to 
quantify the direct and indirect losses to the 
Indian economy on account of the pandemic.  
 
Input-Output analysis: A methodological 
departure 
 
Many multilateral agencies have used either 
prevailing economic models or sector-wise 
estimates to arrive at the direct economic 
losses due to the lockdown in India. We 
provide a list of such estimates for the Indian 
economy in Table 3 (an exception is ADB, 
2020). But the Covid-19 lockdown has not 
just directly disrupted production across 
sectors, but also indirectly affected other 
sectors either because of an impact on inter-
sectoral demand for inputs or due to 
slowdown in final demand due to reduced 
incomes and employment. In this paper, we 
depart from such traditional methods, and 
present estimates of economic losses based 
on an Input-Output (I-O) analysis. The I-O 
analysis includes direct and indirect impacts due 
to multiplier effects in each sector resulting 
from changes in the other sectors. 
 
The I-O analysis is an analytical framework 
developed by Wassily Leontief in the late-
1930s using a system of linear equations. 
Each equation describes the distribution of 
the output of a commodity, in value terms, 
throughout the economy. A closed I-O 
model is one where the demand and supply 
in the system are balanced through a series of 
national accounts (Miller and Blair, 2009).  
 
In the recent years, Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) models of the 
neoclassical variety have been popular as a 
method of simulating economic activity and 
forecasting outcomes. These models use 
neoclassical assumptions of perfectly rational 
agents transacting within markets that allow 
a large degree of substitution between inputs 
viz., capital and labour. These models 
typically consist of a large set of non-linear 
production functions. These functions are 
sensitive to parametric assumptions and 
provide an overall result without 
transparently examining the relationship 
between sectors that result in the estimated 
outcomes.  
 
In contrast, I-O models are a set of 
transparent linear computations that allow 
for a more detailed sector-wise examination 
of the impacts of external shocks. In our 
view, they are better suited to analyse the 
impact of Covid-19 on economic activity.  
 
The common criticisms directed at I-O 
models are three: (a) the technical 
coefficients that determine inter-sectoral 
dependence remain constant over time; (b) 
the analysis assumes constant returns to 
scale; and (c) the elasticity of substitution for 
all inputs is zero. It is argued that the above 
three characteristics of I-O models are 
deviations from the actual behaviour of the 
economy.  
 
While these criticisms are valid to an extent, 
they apply mainly to analyses that attempt 
forecasting of future economic behaviour. 
The analysis presented in this paper does not 
attempt to forecast economic activity into the 
future. The only time dependent analysis that 
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we attempt is the estimation of an I-O table 
for 2019-2020 and 2020-21 based on the 
coefficients for the year 2016-2017. The 
period of forecast here is relatively short. 
While all the coefficients may not hold, it is 
reasonable to assume that the variation may 
be relatively small.  
 
Table 3 Forecasts for real GDP growth by different agencies, India, 2020-21, in per cent 
Agency/Institution 
Latest Previous 
Forecast Month Forecast Month 
CMIE -5.5 July -6.0 May 
RBI forecasters survey (Median) -5.8 Aug -1.5 June 
FICCI Survey -4.5 June 5.5 January 
Government of India Decline - 2.0-3.0 May 
World Bank -3.2 June 1.5-2.8 April 
International Monetary Fund -4.5 June 1.9 April 
Asian Development Bank -4.0 June 4.0 April 
Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
(OECD) 
-3.7 June 5.1 March 
S&P Global Ratings -5.0 May 1.8 April 
Fitch Ratings -5.0 May 0.8 April 
Moody’s -4.0 June 0.0 May 
ICRA -9.5 July -5.0 May 
CRISIL -5.0 May 1.8 April 
Care Rating -6.4 July -1.5 May 
India Ratings -5.3 June 1.9-2.1 April 
State Bank of India -6.8 May 1.1 April 
Bank of America Securities -4.0 July -3.0 June 
DBS Group -4.8 July - - 
Citi Group -6.0 July 3.5 - 
Goldman Sachs -5.0 May -0.5 May 
Nomura -6.1 July -5.2 May 
Source: Swamy (2020). 
 
There is a reason why we rely on an I-O table 
for 2016-17. An I-O table for 2019-2020 is 
not available. The last official I-O table 
published by the Government of India is for 
2007-08. Since the Indian economy has 
undergone significant structural changes 
since then, the coefficients estimated using 
the I-O table for 2007-08 cannot be applied 
to estimate the economic impacts of Covid-
19. At the same time, an I-O table for India 
for 2016-17 has been published by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). The ADB’s is a 
34 sector I-O table closed with accounts for 
private consumption, government 
consumption, exports, imports, capital 
accumulation and savings, value added and 
indirect taxes. Using this table, we estimate 
the loss in economic output across different 
sectors of the economy for 2019-20 and 
2020-21. 
 
The method used in this paper has previously 
been used in studies that estimated economic 
losses due to natural disasters. While the scale 
of natural disasters is typically regionally 
confined, the nature of their impact in terms 
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of the simultaneous declines in both demand 
and supply is similar to the impact of the 
Covid-19 lockdown. Yasuhide Okuyama has 
a series of papers on the use of this method 
for assessing losses due to natural disasters 
(see Okuyama and Santos, 2014; Okuyama, 
2007; Okuyama et al., 2004). I-O models have 
also more recently been used to assess the 
impacts of Covid-19 in specific sectors. For 
example, Baldwin and Tomiura (2020) 
applied the I-O method to assess the impact 
of Covid-19 on international trade. The ADB 
has evaluated the economic impact of Covid-
19 on developing Asian economies (ADB, 
2020). The method used in this paper broadly 




We begin with the I-O Table for India for 
2016-17. From this table, the matrix of 
technical coefficients [A] was calculated using 
Equation (1). The Leontief matrix [L] was 
then calculated using Equation (2).  
 𝐴 = 𝑍 × ?̂?−1                                               (1) 𝐿 = [𝐼 − 𝐴]−1                                             (2) 
 
where Z is the matrix of intermediate 
consumption by each sector, which 
represents the distribution of an industry’s 
output across different sectors of the 
economy; x is the vector of total outputs 
from each sector; and ?̂? is a square matrix 
with diagonal elements representing the total 
output in each sector.  
 
A pro-rata growth rate for the final demand 
in each sector was then applied to derive the 
actual final demand for 2019-20, and the 
expected final demand for 2020-21. This gave 
us the final demand vectors [f2019-20] and [f2020-
21]. The growth rate in final demand was 
assumed and adjusted such that the expected 
GVA for the two years, without COVID-19, 
matched the projections made by the 
Ministry of Statistics and Programme 
Implementation, Government of India. The 
I-O coefficients represented by the matrix 
[A], and the wages-to-profit ratio, were 
assumed to be constant over this period. 
Applying the standard Leontief equation, i.e., 𝑥 = 𝐿 × 𝑓, to the two demand vectors [f] for 
2019-20 and 2020-21, we obtained x2019-20 and 
x2020-21. We could therefore calculate Z2019-20, 
Z2020-21, GVA2019-20, GVA2020-21, and then create 
I-O tables for 2019-20 and 2020-21 assuming 
that these were normal years without 
COVID-19. 
 
The next step was to estimate the impact of 
Covid-19 on economic activity and the total 
potential losses. At the outset, we must state 
a few limitations of the exercise. First, it was 
difficult to estimate the exact value of loss as 
the economic situation is evolving and 
changing rapidly. Secondly, because the 
output varies across the year and the quarter 
in which economic activity is halted will 
affect the total loss estimations, a sub-annual 
analysis was difficult to do; quarterly I-O 
tables and output estimates are not available.  
 
Thirdly, the unprecedented scale and impact 
of Covid-19 is likely to result in changes in 
structural inter-dependencies in the economy 
represented in the I-O table. In such a 
dynamic context, it was difficult to arrive at 
very precise estimates. Fourthly, the I-O table 
fails to capture all the information about the 
informal sector, which plays a significant role 
in the Indian economy. Due to all these 
reasons, the estimates of economic loss that 
we present here should be considered 
conservative estimates. The scenarios we 
construct address this uncertainty by 
providing a wide range of possibilities.  
 
We constructed four scenarios based on a 
range of potential lockdown days for each 
sector in the economy. The loss per day was 
calculated as the ratio of total potential 
economic output in a normal year for each 
sector and the number of days in the year. 
The product of the lockdown days and 
potential output per day gave us the total 
output loss in each sector i represented by the 
vector [Δxi]. The standard linear I-O analysis 
using the Leontief matrix required a change 
in the final demand [Δf]. Therefore, the 
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change in output was converted to a change 
in final demand by dividing the total output 
vector [Δx2020] by the diagonal of the square 
matrix [L], as shown in Equation (3). This 
methodology is discussed in detail in Miller 
and Blair (2009). The direct impact of a loss 
of output on final demand was captured by 
the diagonal elements of the matrix [L]. 
 [∆𝑓] = [𝐿𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔]−1  ×  [∆𝑥]   (3) 
 
The resultant vector [Δf] is the 
corresponding loss in final demand. The total 
potential output loss as well as the reduction 
in final demand was then estimated for 2019-
20 and 2020-21. The new final demand 
vectors [fCV] were estimated by subtracting 
[Δf] from [f].7 New row vectors [XCV], square 
matrices [ZCV], and column vectors [GVACV] 
were calculated and new I-OCV tables were 
constructed for both years to reflect the 




We construct four scenarios by varying the 
potential down-time for each sector across 
the economy. Table 4 shows the average 
down-time across all sectors of the economy, 
and the resulting loss in GVA for each 
scenario in 2019-20 and 2020-21. While the 
first Covid-19 case in India was registered on 
30 January 2020, the pandemic truly arrived 
on Indian shores only by March 2020. 
Therefore, the workdays lost in 2019-20 are 
likely to be relatively less. Our sector-wise 
assumptions about lockdown periods are 
broadly based on Government of India’s 
official notifications on the classification of 
which goods and services were “essential”, 
and the respective rules applicable to these 
sectors at different points in the five months 
between 24 March 2020 and 30 August 2020.  
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with respect 
















in real GDP 
with respect 
to GDP in 
the previous 
year (%) 
Scenario-1 5 2.3 6.2 31 11.9 -6.0 
Scenario-2 7 2.9 5.6 40 16.1 -10.5 
Scenario-3 9 3.4 5.0 53 20.4 -15.1 
Scenario-4 9 3.4 5.0 70 26.3 -21.4 
Source: Computed by authors. 
Note: *: These are averages across all sectors. Economic activity in some sectors has either been completely 
halted or severely curtailed for a long period of time. Other sectors, in contrast, have officially not 
been shut down but have nevertheless experienced curtailment. Our scenarios are built on the basis 
of an approximation of the number of days lost in each sector due to the lockdown. 
 
The results show that India’s economic losses 
in 2019-20 itself range from 2 to 3 per cent 
of the expected GVA if indirect impacts are 
 
7 The term “CV” is used to denote the estimates of all 
relevant vectors and matrices post COVID-19, i.e. 
also considered. In 2020-21, the losses are 
considerably higher. The total direct and 
indirect losses due to the pandemic in 2020-
after taking into account the losses due to the lock-
down period.  
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21 range from 12 to 26 per cent of the 
expected GVA without the pandemic. This 
results in an actual negative growth rate in the 
GDP that ranges from -6 per cent to -21 per 
cent.  
 
On 31 August 2020, the CSO published its 
first estimate of the growth of GVA and 
GDP for Q1 of 2020-21.8 It estimated that 
the growth rate of GVA was -22.8 per cent 
and of GDP was -23.9 per cent. While the 
nation-wide lockdown was lifted on 31 May 
2020, many industries and services continued 
to either remain shut or function in a 
curtailed capacity in July and August 2020. As 
a result, the growth estimates for Q2 are also 
likely to be negative. It is likely, therefore, 
that the losses would be much higher than 
those estimated by other agencies as shown 
in Table 3. In our view, the annual growth 
rate for 2020-21 is likely to be somewhere 
between Scenario 3 and 4 (Table 4).  
 
We note two potential ameliorating factors 
here: one, a moderate growth upswing in Q4, 
if not in Q3, of 2020-21; and two, a possible 
fresh fiscal stimulus package from the 
government, which might help in reviving 
demand (see next section).  
 
We have not included two aspects in our 
scenarios. One, the revival of wage 
compensations may be delayed even if the 
lockdown is lifted. Two, schools, colleges and 
other educational institutions were 
functioning in offline modes, and revenue 
from events like sports or cultural activities 
continued to be low at the time of our 
writing. Despite the exclusion of these 
factors, our results show the pervasiveness of 
the lockdown’s economic impact. Further, 
even in those sectors classified as “essential” 
and allowed to function during the 
lockdown, there may be major indirect 
economic losses. For example, electricity, gas 
and water supply were to be essential sectors 
and fully operational through the lockdown. 
Yet, a loss of 5 per cent to 12 per cent was 
 
8 See the official press release available at 
http://mospi.nic.in/sites/default/files/press_release
/PRESS_NOTE-Q1_2020-21.pdf.  
observed in this sector in the four scenarios. 
Agriculture also suffered losses of 8 per cent 
to 11 per cent despite the fact that the 








Given the economic losses, firm closures and 
losses in employment, it would be wrong to 
assume that the economic activities would 
return to normal when the lockdown is lifted. 
Surveys on the economy show that business 
and consumer sentiments were not 
improving even in July 2020, and a revival of 
the economy may be delayed. Two sets of 
survey results from the Reserve Bank of 
India’s (RBI) bi-monthly Consumer 
Confidence Surveys (CCS) would bear this 
assessment out. First, the Current Situation 
Index in the economy was lower for the three 
months beginning in July 2020 compared to 
for the three months beginning in March 
2020 and May 2020 (Figure 13). Secondly, the 
Future Expectations Index in the economy 
for the three months beginning in July 2020 
was higher than for May 2020, but still lower 
than for March 2020 (Figure 13). 
 
As lockdowns are lifted, supply chain 
disruptions would ease even if supply may 
normalise only with a lag. Here, the extent to 
which production would be restored depends 
also on the extent of firm survival and the 
success of credit and liquidity injection 
measures. On the other hand, losses in 
employment are a huge drain of aggregate 
demand in the economy. Employment levels 
may not reach February 2020 levels anytime 
soon in 2020-21. Even if levels of 
employment are restored, they are still likely 
to be of less-skilled and less-paid forms. In 
such a circumstance, stimulus measures by 
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governments would have to play a central 
role in reviving demand.  
 
Governments in the developed world have 
stepped in with unprecedented levels of 
intervention in the economy. These 
interventions took multiple forms. 
Compensations to farmers for economic 
losses, furlough packages to pay firms up to 
80 per cent of wage bills, direct cash 
payments to workers, injections of liquidity, 
provision of credit at zero interest rate or 
without collateral, free supply of food or 
food stamps and recapitalisation of banks are 
examples.  
 
Figure 13 Index of current economic situation and future economic expectations, India, 2019 and 2020, base year 2011-12 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai. 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
classifies interventions into two types: one, 
direct spending and revenue measures called 
“above-the-line measures”; two, loans, equity 
injections and guarantees called “below-the-
line measures”. IMF’s estimate in April 2020 
was that $7.8 trillion was the size of planned 
interventions of governments across the 
world. Of this, about 3.3 trillion (42 per cent) 
was accounted for by direct spending and 
revenue measures. The remaining $4.5 
trillion (57 per cent) was accounted for by 
loans, equity injections and guarantees (IMF, 
2020).  
 
It is in this context that we study India’s 
economic response to the pandemic. India, 
till 30 August 2020, has announced a total of 
Rs 20.97 trillion as the Covid-19 economic 
stimulus package. This amounts to about 10 
per cent of India’s GDP, which makes the 
package appear impressive. However, there 
are important qualifiers.  
 
First, the appeal of India’s stimulus package 
is largely deceptive. Many announcements 
made were already included as part of the 
budget for 2020-21 presented in February 
2020. Of the Rs 20.97 trillion announced, 
only Rs 3.1 trillion constituted direct fiscal 
spending or exemptions. In other words, 
only 15.4 per cent of the package would be 
“above-the-line” measures (see Table 5). The 
rest constituted loans, credit guarantees and 
liquidity enhancement measures from the 
banking system. If we consider only above-
the-line measures, the size of the India’s 
package would shrink to just 1.5 per cent of 
the GDP. If we are more liberal, and exclude 
only the liquidity injection measures by the 
RBI, the total size of the package would be 
5.3 per cent of the GDP. Thus, India’s 
stimulus package was smaller than those 
announced by other major economies of the 
world.  
 
Secondly, the size of India’s package was 
small relative to the stringency of its 
lockdown. The Oxford COVID-19 
Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) 
estimates a country-wise Stringency Index for 
lockdown based on 17 indicators, such as 
school closures and travel restrictions. The 
index ranges between 0 and 100 (100 for 
most stringent). More stringent the 
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expected. India had one of the most stringent 
lockdowns in the world. Yet, the size of 
India’s stimulus package was smaller than for 
countries with less stringent lockdowns 
(Figure 14). In Japan, the package constituted 
21.1 per cent of the GDP; even in Sweden, 
with one of the most relaxed lockdowns, the 
package constituted 12 per cent of the GDP.  
Thirdly, even within the above-the-line 
measures, only a small share was aimed at 
raising aggregate demand or increasing 
capital investment in the economy. In fact, 
India’s package has been termed by many as 
a supply-side package. 
 
Table 5 India’s Covid-19 economic stimulus package, in per cent 
Type of 
intervention 
Details Outlay as share 
of GDP (%) 







Provision of in-kind (food; 
cooking gas) and in-cash transfers 
to lower income households; 
insurance coverage for workers in 
the healthcare sector; wage 
support and employment 





Increase number of hospital beds, 
ventilators, intensive care facilities 




To support businesses and shore 
up credit provision to several 
sectors of the economy and 
sections of the population 
8.5 84.6 
All measures 10.0 100.0 
Measures with direct bearing on the government budget/deficits 1.5 15.4 
Source: Computed by authors from government documents and official press briefings. 
 
Figure 14 Relationship between size of Covid stimulus packages and the strictness of lockdowns, selected countries, 2020 
 
Source: Compiled from official sources and OxCGRT. 
Note: India-1 = total size of package; India-2 = package after deducting 






























































Fourthly, the overriding reliance in the 
package on fresh loans through the banking 
system, as well as moratorium on loan 
repayments, has raised fears about the long-
term health of the banking system. India’s 
banks, even prior to the pandemic, were 
burdened with high levels of non-performing 
assets (NPA). There was no indication that 
forcing banks to provide fresh loans, with 
little attention to creditworthiness, would be 
associated with any measure to recapitalise 
banks. In the absence of recapitalisation, the 
long-term outlook of the banking system may 
be adverse. 
 
Finally, given the high levels of reliance of the 
package on bank credit, the success of the 
package would depend on whether the 
banking system would be able to deliver the 
promise of fresh credit provision. The 
growth of India’s domestic bank credit was 
slowing down from 2011-12. Given this 
falling growth of credit provision, it is 






This paper dealt with the impact of the 
Covid-19 pandemic on the Indian economy. 
The health crisis has been accompanied by an 
unprecedented economic crisis, where 
demand and supply have fallen 
autonomously and concurrently, even as they 
depress each other in feedback loops. The 
intensity of this crisis was exacerbated by the 
fact that both the global and the Indian 
economy were on a slowdown even prior to 
the pandemic. The Indian economy was 
marked by a slowdown of economic growth, 
a decline in investment, savings, bank credit 
and exports relative to the size of the 
economy and record increases in 
unemployment and income-poverty. As a 
result, India’s capacity to deal with a new 
crisis stood seriously diminished when the 
pandemic hit in March 2020. 
The post-pandemic economic crisis affected 
all economic sectors. In agriculture, farmers 
were faced with broken supply chains, lack of 
market outlets, poor demand and falling 
output prices. Our analysis of market arrivals 
of 16 agricultural commodities between 
March and May 2020 brought home this 
reality in the countryside. In industry, micro 
and small enterprises were the most acutely 
affected. Surveys showed that about 35 per 
cent of all MSMEs were likely to shut down 
permanently. Very few firms expected a 
revival to begin before November-December 
2020. The crisis also led to a major loss of 
employment; even in August 2020, the 
number of employed persons was less by 13.5 
million than in February 2020. 
 
Using a I-O framework, this paper attempted 
an original assessment of the extent of direct 
and indirect losses to the Indian economy. 
Based on four scenarios of losses, we 
estimated that India’s GDP growth rate in 
2020-21 may range from -6 per cent to -21.4 
per cent. In terms of GVA, these losses imply 
a loss of 12 to 26 per cent under different 
scenarios. These estimates did not take factor 
in potential ameliorating factors, such as a 
fiscal stimulus package from the government. 
 
But the government’s economic response till 
August 2020 was seriously deficient on 
demand-side interventions. The extent of 
short-run and long-run employment losses 
demanded that the package focussed on 
raising demand through employment 
generation. Yet, allocations for employment 
generation were raised only marginally. The 
government was hesitant to expand spending 
because it feared a rise in fiscal deficit. Such 
fiscal conservatism is not new under India’s 
neoliberal regimes. However, India has 
remained steadfast in its adherence to fiscal 
conservatism even as advanced capitalist 
economies have shed the dogma of austerity. 
This is illustrative of a certain ideological 
orthodoxy that marks India’s present right-
wing dispensation. Given this conjuncture, 
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